Neural Correlates of Impaired Attentional Control in Social Anxiety: an ERP Study by Judah, Matt R.
   THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF IMPAIRED 
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL IN SOCIAL ANXIETY:  
AN ERP STUDY 
 
 
   By 
MATTHEW RYAN JUDAH 
   Bachelor of Arts in Psychology  
   Ozark Christian College/  
Missouri Southern State University 
   Joplin, MO 
   2007 
 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 




THE NEURAL CORRELATES OF IMPAIRED 
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL IN SOCIAL ANXIETY: 
AN ERP STUDY 
 
 
   Thesis  Approved: 
 
Dr. DeMond M. Grant 
Thesis Adviser 
Dr. Melissa Burkley 
 
Dr. R. Matt Alderson 
 
Dr. Sheryl A. Tucker 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 
 
  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ..........................................................................................5 
  
 Overview of Social Anxiety Disorder......................................................................5 
 Cognitive Models of Social Anxiety Disorder.........................................................5 
 Attentional Biases in Social Anxiety Disorder ........................................................9 
 Self-focused Attention ...........................................................................................10 
 Hypervigilance .......................................................................................................12 
 Theories of Trait Anxiety and Attention ................................................................18 
 Support for Processing Efficiency Theory and Attentional Control Theory .........21 
  Inhibition ..........................................................................................................24 
  Shifting .............................................................................................................26 
 Event-related Potentials .........................................................................................28 
 Current Study .........................................................................................................31 
  
 
III. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................34 
 
 Participants .............................................................................................................34 
 Materials ................................................................................................................34 
 Procedure ...............................................................................................................36 
 Eye-tracking ...........................................................................................................37 
 Electroencephalography .........................................................................................38 
 Event-related Potentials .........................................................................................39 
 Manipulation Check ...............................................................................................40 
 Operational Definitions ..........................................................................................40 
 Analytical Approach ..............................................................................................41 






Chapter          
 Page 
 
IV. FINDINGS .............................................................................................................44 
 
 Sample Characteristics ...........................................................................................44 
 Manipulation Check ...............................................................................................45 
 Eye-tracking ...........................................................................................................45 














LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table            Page 
 
   1 Comparison of HSA and LSA Groups on Self-Report Measures ..........................45 
vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure           Page 
 
   1 Mixed Antisaccade Task ........................................................................................37 








Cognitive models of social anxiety disorder (SAD; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997) describe mental processes which socially anxious individuals (HSAs) 
utilize in feared social situations.  These processes broadly include three categories of 
information-processing biases (see Amir & Foa, 2001; Heinrichs and Hofmann, 2001 for 
a review): interpretation biases (see Hirsch & Clark, 2004 for a review), memory biases 
(see Morgan, 2010 for a review), and attentional biases.  Interpretation biases occur as 
HSAs construe ambiguous social events to be more threatening.  Memory biases in SAD 
include a tendency to recall negative events more easily and positive events with more 
difficulty.  Attentional biases describe the preoccupation of mental resources by salient 
processes or stimuli, which in the case of SAD are those that indicate a high likelihood of 
negative evaluation.  Attentional biases are of particular interest because they may 
generate the other information processing biases and interfere with behaviors that enable 
successful social interaction. 
Because social fears are at the core of SAD, these individuals devote excessive 
attentional resources to determine whether they are being evaluated.  This results in 
attentional biases including self-focused attention (Barlow, 2002; Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and vigilance for environmental cues indicating negative 
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evaluation (Barlow, 2002; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Schultz & Heimberg, 2008).  
Cognitive models of social anxiety predict that self-focused attention and hypervigilance 
should preoccupy attentional resources and potentially lead to impairment in behavioral 
processes dependent on attention.  These theories, however, currently lack evidence 
supporting this prediction and specificity in describing how this might occur.  
Consequently, models focusing on the relationship between trait anxiety and performance 
may be useful to derive hypotheses to expand current knowledge of SAD.  Specifically, 
attentional control theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) proposes that 
anxiety depletes the resources of the central executive subsystem of working memory.  
Recently, predictions from this model have been tested in order to determine their 
generalizability for SAD (Amir & Bomyea, 2011; Wieser, Pauli, & Mühlberger, 2009); 
yet more extensive research is needed.  Therefore, the purpose of this study was to test 
the implications of attentional control theory for SAD and thereby increase our 
understanding of the effects of social anxiety on the central executive and on processes 
that rely on working memory.  This may help explicate the attentional processes that 
result from anxious symptomatology as well as their contribution to performance deficits.  
More specifically, this study tested whether social anxiety was associated with impaired 
executive control of attention.     
Anxiety is postulated to impair performance across two levels (Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992; Eysenck, et al, 2007): 1) processing efficiency, the quantity of cognitive resources 
allocated to the execution of a task, and 2) effectiveness, the proportion of correct to 
incorrect responses.  These models propose that anxiety interferes ubiquitously with 
efficiency, whereas interference with effectiveness occurs only in situations in which 
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anxiety consumes cognitive resources needed to perform optimally.  Various 
methodologies have been utilized in order to assess processing efficiency, especially 
those measuring reaction time.  Perhaps the most promising of these is the use of event-
related potentials (ERPs), which measure the electrical activity associated with cognitive 
processes with high temporal resolution.  Event-related potentials are 
electrophysiological wave forms generated as a result of neural processes.  ERPs have 
been used to document attentional biases in trait anxiety (Carretié, Mercado, Hinojosa, 
Martín-Loeches, & Sotillo, 2004; Bar-Haim, Lamy, & Glickman, 2005), resulting 
impaired processing efficiency (Murray & Janelle, 2007; Dennis & Chen, 2008; Righi, 
Mecacci, & Viggiano, 2009), and activation of compensatory strategies used to maintain 
performance effectiveness (Dennis & Chen, 2008; Righi, et al., 2009).  For example, 
Righi and colleagues (2009) found that high trait-anxious individuals recruit 
compensatory attentional effort, as indexed by larger N2 amplitudes, in order to maintain 
performance.  
Thus, it is timely that these approaches be applied to examining the attentional 
processes of SAD.  The hypothesis that attention biases may impair navigation of the 
social environment has important implications for understanding and treating SAD.  
Research has shown that social performance deficits can lead to rejection which in turn 
may maintain social fears (Meleshko & Alden, 1993; Voncken, Alden, Bögels, & 
Roelofs, 2008).  Additionally, cognitive models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997) suggest that memories of social rejection are used to shape how HSAs 
view themselves in social situations.  Thus the interference of attentional biases with 
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effective social behaviors may serve to perpetuate anxious symptomatology, and hence, 
may be an important area to target in treatment. 
The current study utilized predictions from models of trait anxiety and attention to 
hypothesize that attentional bias in SAD, namely self-focused attention, would result in 
diminished processing efficiency.  This was examined using a mixed antisaccade task in 
which subjects were required to perform cued saccades (ballistic eye movements) toward 
or away from stimuli appearing in their parafoveal vision.  Self-focused attention was 
manipulated in 20% of the trials via a circle which appeared around the cue.  Prior to the 
experiment, subjects were told that this indicated increased heart rate and that they should 
ignore it.  Two ERP components event-locked to cue onset were examined: the CNV, a 
slow-wave fronto-central negativity peaking between 260 and 470 ms after cue onset 
which is associated with the recruitment of processing resources in response preparation, 
and the P3b, a positive parietal potential occurring 450-600 ms post-stimulus which is 
associated with stimulus probability and the attentional effort devoted to stimulus 
categorization (Luck, 2005; Polich, 2007).  Previous research has linked CNV amplitude 
to the recruitment of effort to respond to an anticipated stimulus (see Rösler, Heil, & 
Röder, 1997).  Similarly, increases in task difficulty have been shown to reduce P3b 
amplitude (Kok, 2001).  Therefore, it was predicted that HSAs would have stronger CNV 
amplitudes than LSAs on all trials and that the CNV would emerge later.  Further, P3b 
amplitude was expected to be diminished and to have a later onset for HSAs in the 
presence of threat.  It was also predicted that HSAs would have later onset times for 






REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Overview of Social Anxiety Disorder 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is the most common of the anxiety disorders, and 
research estimates a 3-13% lifetime prevalence (APA, 2000; Jefferys, 1997).  This 
disorder is characterized by excessive fear of being negatively evaluated in social and 
performance situations (APA, 2000).  SAD also involves a desire to achieve closeness to 
others and the belief that one will be unable to do so (Alden, 2001; Clark & Wells, 1995).  
Anxious symptomatology causes impairment and distress in interpersonal and/or 
occupational functioning (APA, 2000).  Broadly, social anxiety symptoms may be 
generalized to most social situations or circumscribed to specific ones (APA, 2000; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  Symptoms also may manifest with a variety of idiographic 
characteristics, such as blushing and specific safety behaviors. 
Cognitive Models of Social Anxiety Disorder 
 Cognitive approaches to understanding SAD have contributed an important 
framework for integrating empirical evidence.  These models (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) propose that individuals high in social anxiety (HSAs) fear 
being evaluated negatively by others and believe that this is likely to occur.  As a result, 
cues in the environment which indicate the likelihood of evaluation from 
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others are especially salient.  HSAs focus attention on aspects of the self which they fear 
may catalyze this process.  More specifically, they adopt an observer perspective of 
themselves, often exaggerating the conspicuousness of their negative features.  Memories 
of past social experiences, as well as proprioceptive and physiological awareness, are 
used to inform this self-image and to make predictions about the likelihood of rejection.  
Secondly, HSAs exercise vigilance for stimuli in the environment that indicate the social 
evaluation which they fear (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  Following the feared situation, 
social phobics tend to engage in post-event processing, typified by recall of the social 
situation and negative interpretations of the self’s role in that situation (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
Cognitive models of SAD suggest that socially anxious individuals believe others 
to be fundamentally critical and evaluative of them (Clark, 2001; Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  Because socially anxious individuals place a premium upon 
being liked and accepted by others, beliefs that they will be negatively evaluated are 
particularly threatening to them.  Various processes emerging from these beliefs result in 
anxious symptomatology.  These may occur when feared social situations are 
encountered, when they are expected to occur, or afterward (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).   
Socially anxious individuals often utilize strategies to prevent behaviors that 
might lead to rejection by others.  These strategies, known as safety behaviors, are 
classically exemplified in individuals who try to cover or turn away their faces out of fear 
that others will see them blushing.  Safety behaviors may also include mental processes, 
such as planning what one will say in certain situations (Clark, 2001).  Anxiety is 
maintained through safety behaviors because they are credited with the non-occurrence of 
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social rejection, which in turn, reinforces these behaviors (Clark, 2001; Clark & Wells, 
1995; Salkovskis, 1996; Wells, Clark, Salkovskis, & Ludgate, 1995).  Further, certain 
safety behaviors may increase the likelihood of socially undesirable behaviors (Stevens et 
al., 2010) thus leading to further negative ruminations about the outcome of social 
experiences. 
Attentional processes play a key role in cognitive models (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  They propose that socially anxious individuals form a third-
person mental image of their appearance and behavior as they believe it is perceived by 
others.  This mental representation is not merely a mental photograph nor does it reflect 
how the individual views the self.  Rather, it is an estimation of how they are perceived 
and evaluated by others.  This involves self-focused attention, the direction of attentional 
resources toward the self.  Additionally, socially anxious individuals monitor the 
environment for cues that they are being negatively evaluated by others (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997).  This occurs via the allocation of attentional resources to sampling the 
external environment for indicators of potential threat.   
Self-focused attention as described by cognitive models (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) is particularly directed toward aspects of the self that are 
salient to fear of negative evaluation (i.e., negative facets of the self which might elicit 
negative judgments from others).  The mental representation of the self is assumed to be 
one likely to receive negative evaluation from others.  It is based on knowledge about 
one’s appearance and previous social experiences, awareness of one’s physiological 
arousal, and information gleaned from the environment, such as cues from others.  
Attention is focused on aspects of the self which may be judged negatively as these 
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features are particularly salient.  It is therefore likely to be negatively distorted.  Further, 
external cues used to modify the mental image of the self, whether verbal or non-verbal, 
are often ambiguous and therefore easily distorted. 
Socially anxious individuals then evaluate their performance and compare it to 
standards which they believe others expect of them.  Based on the degree of discrepancy 
between these, estimations of the probability of negative evaluation are formed.  
Awareness of this perceived discrepancy increases anxiety about being negatively 
evaluated, which in turn, influences physiological responses as well as one’s cognitions 
and behavior.  This may escalate the discrepancy between current and ideal states as the 
estimation of one’s current performance is negatively adjusted (Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997).   
Studies examining whether HSAs actually experience impaired social 
performance have achieved mixed results (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  Although some 
research has demonstrated impaired performance across many functions (Twentyman & 
McFall, 1975), others have found impairment in some functions but not others (Arkowitz, 
Lichtenstein, McGovern, & Hines, 1975; Borkovec, Stone, O’Brien, & Kaloupek, 1974); 
whereas others have found no evidence of impairment (Burgio, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1981; 
Clark & Arkowitz, 1975; Rapee & Lim, 1992).  Rapee and Heimberg (1997) propose that 
these disparate findings may occur because of the moderating role of the structure of the 
situation.  It is interesting to note that these findings are anticipated by theories describing 
the relationship between anxiety and attention (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007).  These models 
predict such mixed results due to variability in attentional capacity and task difficulty. 
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Cognitive models suggest that social phobics process information dysfunctionally.  
These information-processing biases are thought to be maintained by the ambiguity of 
many social environments (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  Because 
socially anxious individuals have a stronger motivation to know what others are thinking 
about them, they engage in self-evaluative thoughts informed by biased information-
processing.  These thoughts are further relied on as socially anxious individuals avoid 
behaviors typically used by normal individuals to disambiguate feedback from others 
(e.g., eye contact).  Three main categories of biased information-processing occur in 
SAD.  These are interpretation biases, memory biases, and attention biases (see Amir & 
Foa, 2001; Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001 for a review). Attentional biases are of particular 
interest in understanding how anxiety may impair behavioral functioning because they 
influence the other two categories of biased cognition.  Further, attentional biases are 
hypothesized to preoccupy attentional resources needed for effective behavior in anxious 
individuals (Eysneck et al, 2007).   
Attentional Biases in SAD 
Attentional biases in SAD include increased attention to the self and 
hypervigilance for threatening stimuli in the environment (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
Although evidence uniformly supports self-focused attention in SAD, support for 
hypervigilance in SAD has met with mixed results (see Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001).  
Evidence for hypervigilance has been challenged by evidence suggesting avoidance of 
threat (e.g., Foa & Kozak, 1986).  This has resulted in the vigilance-avoidance 
hypothesis, which posits that HSAs are initially vigilant and engage in avoidance when 
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threatening stimuli are detected (Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997).  Research 
concerning attentional biases in SAD is discussed in detail below. 
Self-focused Attention. 
Extant research supports the hypothesis that social phobics typically engage in 
self-focused attention in threatening situations.  Hackmann, Surawy, and Clark (1998) 
found that 77% of those in a social phobic sample reported third-person negative images 
of themselves, whereas only 10% of healthy controls reported such images.  Self-focused 
attention has been examined mainly through correlational studies focusing of self-
consciousness (e.g., Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and through experimentally 
controlled social situations (e.g., Mellings & Alden, 2000).  Correlational studies have 
found that social anxiety is correlated with high levels of public self-consciousness, 
attending to facets of the self that others might observe (Fenigstein, et al., 1975; Bruch & 
Heimberg, 1994) but not more private self-consciousness (Hope & Heimberg, 1988).  
Further, low self-ratings of physical attractiveness have been associated with shyness 
(Montgomery, Haimmerlie, & Edwards, 1991), although the ratings of others do not 
support actual lower physical attractiveness (Jones, Briggs, & Smith, 1986).  Taken 
together, these findings suggest that shyness, which is currently thought to be mild social 
anxiety (Crome, Baillie, Slade, & Ruscio, 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), is associated 
with more negative feelings about one’s own appearance than objectivity warrants. 
Other studies have used experimental approaches to examine the association 
between social anxiety and negative images of the self.  One commonly used approach is 
the dyadic interaction paradigm, also known as the getting acquainted paradigm.  These 
studies have supported descriptions from cognitive models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee 
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& Heimberg, 1997) that social phobics monitor their own physiology and use this 
information to construct negative images of the self which they visualize from an 
observer perspective (Mansell, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2002; 
Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 1998; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1999).  Alden and Wallace (1995) 
examined performance self-ratings of men with SAD following a getting acquainted 
paradigm.  They found that men with social phobia believed their anxiety was more 
visible to the interaction partner than it actually was.  Social phobics also rated their own 
performance lower than did normal controls whether the interaction partner’s approach 
was manipulated to be interpersonally warm or aloof.  Other studies using this 
methodology have found that severity of social anxiety is positively correlated with self-
reported self-focus (Hope, Heimberg, & Klein, 1990; Melchior & Cheek, 1990).  Various 
studies have shown that awareness of internal somatic sensations is associated with 
feelings of being negatively evaluated (Mansell & Clark, 1999; McEwan & Devins, 
1983; Mellings & Alden, 2000; Woody, 1996).   
Additionally, psychophysiological approaches have been used to examine self-
focused attention in SAD.  Socially anxious individuals have been found to have higher 
levels of interoceptive awareness as indicated by awareness of heart rate when 
anticipating a speech compared to healthy controls (Stevens et al., 2010).  Research also 
suggests that physiological sensations can increase self-focused attention.  Experiments 
have demonstrated that increasing attention to physiological activity through exercise or 
false heart rate feedback increases self-focused attention (Fenigstein & Carver, 1978; 
Mansell et al., 2003; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2002; Wegner & Giuliano, 1980).  
Papageorgiou and Wells (2002) provided false feedback that the subject’s heart rate had 
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increased prior to a social interaction task.  HSAs compared to LSAs were more sensitive 
to physiological feedback and showed increases in reported anxiety, negative 
interpersonal performance, and imagining themselves from an observer perspective.  The 
increase of heart rate in the feedback, however, did not result in actual increased heart 
rate.  Similarly, Mansell and colleagues (2003) misled participants to believe that a 
device applying a pulse to the fingertip indicated increased physiological response.  They 
found that HSAs, but not LSAs, showed an internal attentional focus specific to social-
evaluative threat.  Other studies have demonstrated that increasing physiological arousal 
increases self-focused attention (Wegner & Giuliano, 1980; Fenigstein & Carver, 1978) 
and vice versa (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Scheier & Carver, 1983).  This supports the 
prediction of cognitive models that physiological markers of anxiety are detected by 
socially anxious individuals and increase their level of self-focused attention, which in 
turn increases physiological arousal in a spiral toward more intense levels of self-focus 
and anxious physiology.  This bi-directional effect may occur in social anxiety causing a 
self-perpetuating spiral that increases self-focused attention. 
Hypervigilance 
Extensive research supports Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) predictions about the 
role of externally oriented attention, also known as vigilance or hypervigilance, in SAD 
(see Cisler & Koster, 2010 for a brief review).  However, the stimuli which elicit 
vigilance from HSAs vary between studies.  Some studies suggest that HSAs are vigilant 
for emotional stimuli in general, whether emotional words (Asmundsen & Stein, 1994; 
Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993) or emotional faces (Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; 
Kolassa, Kolassa, Musial, & Miltner, 2007; Wieser, Pauli, & Mühlberger, 2009), whereas 
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other research supports a bias exclusively for threatening stimuli, whether words (Amir & 
Bomyea, 2011; Grant & Beck, 2006; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; 
Maidenberg, Chen, Craske, Bohn, & Bystritsky, 1996; Mattia, et al., 1993; McNeil, et al., 
1995; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005) or faces (Juth, Lundqvist, 
Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005, study 4; Kolassa et al., 2007; Kolassa & Miltner, 2006; Mogg 
& Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Mühlberger, Wieser, Herrmann, 
Weyers, Tröger, & Pauli, 2009; Pishyar et al, 2004).  Further, research suggests that these 
effects are significantly reduced following treatment of SAD (e.g., Mattia et al., 1993).  
One of the most commonly used paradigms for examining attentional biases is the 
Emotional Stroop Task (see Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996 for a review).  In this 
task, participants are asked to name the color of words which appear individually on a 
display.  Biases in attention are measured via longer response latencies to color-naming 
emotionally threatening words compared to neutral or positive words.  Several studies 
using this methodology have shown that socially anxious individuals take longer to name 
the color of words indicating social threat compared to other stimuli (Amir et al., 1996; 
Grant & Beck, 2006; Hope, et al., 1990; Maidenberg et al, 1996; Mattia et al., 1993; 
McNeil, et al., 1995).   
Other experimental tasks (e.g., dot-probe tasks, visual search tasks, emotional 
saccade tasks) have found support for attentional biases in HSAs.  Dot-probe tasks 
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) present a series of paired stimuli that are adjacent to 
each other on a display.  Following each pair of stimuli, a dot appears in one of the 
positions previously occupied by one of the two stimuli.  Reaction time is measured as 
participants press a button to indicate the position in which the dot appeared.  Stimuli are 
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manipulated so that one indicates threat and the other is either positive or neutral, with 
attention biases being revealed by faster reaction times to dots appearing in the position 
where the threatening stimulus had been.  Some dot-probe studies suggest attentional bias 
toward threat in clinical samples of SAD (e.g., Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Mogg et al., 
2004; Mueller et al., 2009; Musa et al., 2003; Sposari & Rapee, 2007), although others 
have not (e.g., Horenstein & Segui, 1997).   Studies using non-clinical samples also have 
achieved mixed results, with some studies confirming vigilance (e.g., Klumpp & Amir, 
2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Vassilopoulos, 2005) and others failing to do so (e.g., 
Pineles & Mineka, 2005).   
Various explanations for these discrepant findings have been proposed.  
Schmulke (2005) reviewed the dot-probe paradigm and concluded that when used with 
non-clinical samples it yields low internal consistency and test-retest reliability.  One 
reason for this may be that dot-probe tasks are confounded with post-perceptual 
processes, such as decision-making (Handy, Green, Klein, & Mangun, 2001; Mueller et 
al., 2009), a limitation which applies to studies using clinical samples as well.  In order to 
resolve this problem, some recent studies utilizing the dot-probe technique have used 
event-related potentials (ERPs) in order to more accurately measure attentional processes 
(e.g., Mueller et al., 2009).   Another possibility is that comorbid depression reduces 
hypervigilance in SAD, as a few studies suggest (Grant & Beck, 2006; Musa et al., 2003).   
Perhaps the strongest explanation for the mixed dot-probe results of 
hypervigilance in SAD is its inability to discern between vigilance and later attentional 
confounds.  Subjects that do not display speeded orientation toward a stimulus but have 
difficulty disengaging attention from it once it is detected would appear to be 
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hypervigilant.  Similarly, subjects demonstrating enhanced orientation toward a stimulus 
followed by avoidance would not still be attending to the stimulus location when the 
probe appeared, and would hence appear to lack hypervigilance.  In order to resolve this 
problem, Koster and colleagues (2004) compared response times between congruent and 
incongruent trials as is typically done but also included trials containing a pair of neutral 
stimuli which were compared to the standard neutral-threat pairs.  By comparing trials 
containing a threat cue with those that did not, they were able to rule out difficulty in 
disengaging attention as a potential cause for the observed effect.  Future studies using 
this approach may contribute toward disentangling previous findings. 
Visual search tasks (see Frischen, Eastwood, & Smilek, 2008 for a review) form 
another experimental category used to test for vigilance while controlling for the 
confound of difficulty in disengaging attention.  In this paradigm participants are 
instructed to locate faces of a particular emotional valence that is unique in a field of 
other emotional faces.   Visual search tasks have found that socially anxious individuals 
more quickly identify angry versus happy faces when scanning a field of neutral faces in 
which they are embedded (Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999).   
The emotional saccade paradigm is another experimental approach for examining 
hypervigilance.  Emotional saccade tasks test the ability to control eye movements 
toward a target in the presence of a distracter while anti-saccade tasks require subjects to 
control eye gaze away from the emotional target.  Reflexive shifts toward peripheral 
stimuli in the visual field indicate stimulus-driven attention.  One benefit of this approach 
is that it can be used to investigate the effect of attentional biases on specific executive 
functions, such as inhibition and shifting.  However, only a single study using this 
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approach has been conducted to examine hypervigilance in SAD.  This study found that 
socially anxious individuals preferentially attend to facial expressions in general 
compared to healthy controls (Wieser, Pauli, & Mühlberger, 2009).  This supports the 
prediction of Rapee and Heimberg (1997) that socially anxious individuals are more 
attentionally reactive toward social stimuli.  Further use of saccade paradigms to 
investigate attentional biases is discussed in a later section. 
Currently, empirical findings regarding hypervigilance in SAD are not accounted 
for by cognitive models.  Although many studies suggest that HSAs orient attention 
toward threatening stimuli, others suggest that they direct attention away from threat, a 
process known as avoidance (e.g., Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999).  The vigilance-
avoidance hypothesis emerged as an attempt to integrate these disparate findings (e.g., 
Mogg et al., 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005) and predicts that HSAs automatically orient 
attention toward threat (vigilance) and subsequently direct attention away from threat 
(avoidance).  To test this, manipulations of the dot-probe task have used varying stimulus 
onset asynchronies (SOAs), meaning that the elapsed presentation time of the stimuli is 
varied (usually at 500 and 1,250 ms).  Some of these studies have found evidence for the 
hypothesized early, but not late, orientation toward threat, although no evidence was 
found that HSAs are more avoidant of threat cues at either SOA (e.g., Mogg et al., 2004; 
Pishyar et al., 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005).  Similarly, Wieser and colleagues (2009b) 
found that individuals with high fear of negative evaluation showed orientation toward 
emotional faces during the first second of exposure and avoidance from one to one and a 
half seconds after presentation.  Using ERPs, Mueller and colleagues (2009) found 
enhanced early and dissipating late attentional processing of threat stimuli in social 
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phobics.  However, other evidence presents a major problem for the vigilance-avoidance 
hypothesis.  Numerous studies suggest that HSAs have difficulty disengaging attention 
from threatening stimuli (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003; Buckner, Maner, & 
Schmidt, 2010; Moriya & Tanno, 2010, 2011).  The quantity of evidence suggesting both 
avoidance of threat and difficulty in avoidance of threat has not yet been synthesized into 
a validated hypothesis.  One possibility based on attentional control theory (Eysenck et 
al, 2007) is that working memory load moderates the relationship between early vigilance 
and later attentional biases.   
Although extensive research supports attentional biases in SAD as described by 
cognitive models, research has not examined how these attention biases affect concurrent 
cognitive processes.  In other words, research testing cognitive models has not yet probed 
whether self-focused attention and hypervigilance preoccupy limited cognitive resources 
so that they are offline for other important processes.  Interestingly, Rapee and Heimberg 
(1997) describe concurrent self-focused attention and threat-detection in SAD as a 
“multiple-task paradigm” in which these processes and any concurrent executive process 
compete for limited attentional resources.  Thus, individuals engaging in self-focused 
attention or hypervigilance should experience impairment on complex tasks, especially 
under high threat conditions.  Nevertheless, cognitive models lack specificity in 
describing how this multiple-task paradigm impairs task performance.  Therefore, 
research is needed to expand cognitive models to include specific predictions about how 
attention biases affect cognition and behavior.  In order to develop reasonable hypotheses 
about mechanisms between attentional biases and performance, the current study draws 
from models that describe attention and performance in trait anxious individuals. 
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Theories of Trait Anxiety and Attention 
Theories of trait anxiety and attention (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959; Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Sarason, 1988) 
posit that anxiety prompts the allocation of limited attentional resources toward 
processing threat-related information resulting in reduced cognitive resources for task-
relevant processing.  Among recent models, cognitive interference theory (Sarason, 1988) 
proposes that being preoccupied with the self is a core feature of anxiety and that this 
may distract attention from performing other behaviors.  As attention is split between the 
performance of a given task and anxious thoughts, attentional resources devoted to the 
task are depleted.  Sarason divides cognitive processes affected by self-preoccupation 
into three categories: attending to environmental cues, encoding and manipulating 
information, and constructing a behavioral response.  However, the usefulness of 
Sarason’s theory is limited by its lack of specificity for anxiety (i.e., self-preoccupation 
occurs in other cognitive-emotional states, such as anger).  Further, cognitive interference 
theory lacks specific predictions about the cognitive systems affected by anxiety 
(Eysenck, 2010). 
More recent models have borrowed from cognitive interference theory and other 
models to form more specific hypotheses.  Pre-eminent among these models in terms of 
empirical support are the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and the 
attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007).  Processing efficiency theory (PET; 
Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) was proposed in order to address the limitations of cognitive 
interference theory and is the first to suggest that anxiety impairs working memory 
specifically.  It also defines specific ways in which this occurs by drawing a distinction 
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between processing efficiency and effectiveness.  Efficiency is defined as the quantity of 
cognitive resources devoted to achieve a certain level of performance and is usually 
measured as reaction time, whereas effectiveness is the quality of performance as 
measured by correct versus incorrect responses.  PET predicts that worry associated with 
anxiety preoccupies, and thus interferes, with the phonological loop, the subsystem of 
working memory responsible for verbal rehearsal.  This results in two processes.  In the 
first, worry utilizes cognitive resources that would otherwise be used for the task at hand.  
Thus, the efficiency of working memory is diminished.  Secondly, worry prompts the 
recruitment of additional cognitive resources to maintain effectiveness.  If additional 
resources are not available because of high cognitive load, impaired efficiency gives way 
to reduced effectiveness (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007).  Thus, anxious individuals often utilize compensatory strategies in order to 
maintain performance at the cost of efficiency.  Under sufficient cognitive load, however, 
these strategies are thought to be unable to prevent deficits in performance.   
Attentional control theory (Eysenck et al, 2007) represents a revision of PET and 
maintains most of its predictions concerning processing efficiency and performance.  
However, the hypothesis that worry interferes with the phonological loop is replaced by 
the more empirically probable prediction that anxiety interferes with the central executive 
subsystem of working memory.  The central executive manages attentional control, as 
illustrated by the restraint of a prevailing response in order to execute a subdominant 
response (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Ladouceur, Conway, & Dahl, 2010).  ACT 
incorporates two basic attentional domains described by Corbetta and Shullman (2002), 
the goal-oriented attention system, which describes volitional top-down processes by 
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which attention is dedicated to the achievement of a desired outcome, and stimulus-
driven attention, an automatic bottom-up process which is characterized by monitoring of 
the self and/or the environment for salient stimuli.  The stimulus-driven attention system 
is of particular interest to social anxiety research, because it includes both self-focused 
attention and hypervigilance.  According to attentional control theory, anxious 
individuals allocate fewer attentional resources to goal-directed activity (i.e., successful 
social interaction for social phobics) while devoting more attention to stimulus-driven 
processes (i.e., self-focus and hypervigilance).   
PET and ACT draw from Baddeley’s (1974, 2001, 2003, 2010) model of working 
memory to describe how anxiety impairs attentional control.  Working memory differs 
from short-term memory and long-term memory in that it relies on conscious effort in 
order to hold an object in memory (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999).  
Baddeley describes four subsystems, three of which involve temporal storage of 
information, and one which is associated with conscious control of the other systems.  
These subsystems are the phonological loop, which holds verbal-linguistic information, 
the visuospatial sketchpad, which holds mental images and orients them spatially, and the 
episodic buffer, which holds integrated information with both visual and verbal 
components and retrieves information from long term memory.  The central executive 
manages the other three subsystems and controls attentional processes (Barrett et al., 
2004).    
The central executive has been subdivided by various researchers (e.g., Smith & 
Jonides, 1999; Miyake et al., 2000; Nigg, 2000).  These models greatly overlap in their 
descriptions of central executive subfunctions; however, those proposed by Miyake and 
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colleagues (2000; Friedman & Miyake, 2004) are preferred by attentional control theory 
because of their empirical basis.  Miyake and colleagues (2000) used latent variable 
analysis to subdivide the control processes of the central executive into three basic 
functions: inhibition, characterized by the ability to intentionally restrain pre-potent 
stimulus-driven responses; shifting, which describes reallocation of attentional resources 
between tasks or mental representations; and updating, the refreshing of representations 
in working memory.  ACT predicts that anxiety diminishes the aspects of the central 
executive most closely associated with attention, namely, inhibition and shifting 
(Eysenck et al., 2007).  ACT hypothesizes a weaker relationship between anxiety and 
updating than between anxiety and the other control processes of the central executive 
(Eysenck et al., 2007).   
Support for PET and ACT 
Experiments testing the predictions of PET and ACT typically utilize a dual-task 
methodology wherein the efficiency (usually measured as reaction time) and 
effectiveness (usually measured as a ratio of accurate responses to errors) of individuals 
high in trait anxiety is compared to low anxious controls.  The purpose of the secondary 
task is to manipulate cognitive load and overburden working memory capacity in order to 
evoke impairment in effectiveness on the primary task.  The predictions of PET and ACT 
have been supported using this approach in a number of domains including athletic 
situations (see Wilson, 2008 for a review), driving simulations (Murray & Janelle, 2003, 
2007), test-taking (Ng & Lee, 2010; Owens, Stevenson, Norgate, & Hadwin, 2008), and 
at a more basic level, working memory tasks (Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005; 
Johnson & Gronlund, 2009).   
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Numerous studies have confirmed impairment in processing efficiency for high 
trait-anxious individuals.  These include studies which index efficiency through self-
report (Hadwin, Brogan, & Stevenson, 2005; Smith, Bellamy, Collins, & Newell, 2001), 
reaction time (Murray & Janelle, 2003; Williams, Vickers, & Rodrigues, 2002), event-
related potentials (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a, 2011b; Bar-Haim et al., 2005; Dennis & 
Chen, 2007; 2008; Murray & Janelle, 2007; Righi et al., 2009), event-related fMRI (Fales 
et al., 2008; Fales, Beccerril, Luking, & Barch, 2010), and EEG desynchronization 
(Savostyanov et al., 2009).  
The saccade paradigm has been commonly used to test the predictions of 
attentional control theory.  In this methodology, subjects are seated before a monitor and 
focus on a fixation cross in the center of the screen.  When the fixation cross disappears, 
subjects are instructed to shift their visual focus to a peripheral cue as it appears on the 
monitor in what is known as the prosaccade task.  This reflects activation of the stimulus-
driven attentional system to orient overt attention toward a salient stimulus (i.e., 
vigilance).  More interestingly, the antisaccade task requires the subject to look at a 
position on the screen opposite to the position where the cue appears.  This task requires 
the individual to engage the goal-driven attentional system to inhibit the stimulus-driven 
system.  Modifications of this paradigm using emotional peripheral stimuli have been 
used to confirm impaired attentional control in anxious individuals as indicated by 
prosaccadic errors (looking toward distracters on antisaccade trials) to positive, negative, 
and neutral facial expressions (e.g., Wieser, Pauli, & Mühlberger, 2009) and slower 
antisaccade latencies on correct responses, especially when using threatening cues 
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(Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 2008; Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, & Eysenck, 
2009).   
Many studies testing ACT utilize the probe technique in order to disentangle 
processing efficiency from effectiveness (Eysenck, 2010).  This is a dual-task paradigm 
wherein subjects are instructed to perform an easy secondary task at intermittent cues if 
spare resources remain after prioritizing the primary task.  The probe technique has been 
used to confirm impaired processing efficiency in high trait-anxious subjects as indexed 
by longer response times to auditory probes during a driving simulation (Murray & 
Janelle, 2003, 2007), while playing table tennis (Williams et al., 2002), and while 
performing basic working memory tasks (unpublished manuscript described in Eysenck, 
2010).  Other dual-task designs, such as that used by Eysenck and colleagues (2005), 
have supported ACT.  High and low trait-anxious subjects completed a Corsi Block Task, 
in which participants observe and reproduce a sequence of taps on an arrangement of 
blocks, while performing a secondary task utilizing either the phonological loop, the 
visuospatial sketchpad, or the central executive.  Impaired performance on the Corsi task 
was found to result in high-trait anxious individuals performing the concurrent central 
executive task only, thus supporting the predictions of ACT that anxiety specifically 
interferes with attentional control.   
PET and ACT predict that individuals who are low in working memory capacity 
are most vulnerable to the impairing effects of anxiety.  In contrast, two studies found 
that only individuals high in working memory capacity experienced performance deficits 
when anxiety was induced (Beilock & Carr, 2005; Beilock, Kulp, Holt, & Carr, 2004).  
The authors of these studies proposed that these individuals were more likely to rely upon 
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strategies emphasizing attentional control, thus making them more vulnerable to 
anxiety’s impairing effects upon this system.  Addressing this discrepancy, Johnson and 
Gronlund (2009) showed that individuals with lower working memory capacity were 
more vulnerable to the detrimental effects of anxiety on task performance.  They suggest 
that the discrepant results of Beilock and Carr (2005) and Beilock and colleagues (2004) 
may have occurred due to failure to account for trait anxiety and the use of tasks which 
allowed room for various cognitive strategies.  
Attentional control theory predicts that the inhibition and shifting functions of the 
central executive are particularly vulnerable to anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007).  Recently, 
studies have investigated the effects of anxiety on these subfunctions of the central 
executive.  Research testing the predictions of ACT regarding these processes is 
discussed below. 
Inhibition 
Various experimental designs have been used to test the effect of anxiety on 
inhibition.  One of the most commonly used is the emotional Stroop task.  This 
methodology has shown that clinical samples are slower to name the colors of words 
salient to their diagnostic status, indicating impairment in the ability to inhibit attention to 
task-irrelevant threat cues in order to efficiently process word content (see Williams, 
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996 for a review).     
The saccade paradigm has been identified as one of the most valid measures of 
inhibition (Miyake et al., 2000).  Anti-saccade tasks are particularly useful in studies of 
the inhibition function because they require suppression of pre-potent responses (looking 
toward a stimulus) as well as subsequent initiation of a secondary action (directing gaze 
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in the direction adjacent to the stimulus; Hutton & Ettinger, 2006).  Studies using this 
approach have found that high trait anxious individuals compared to low trait anxious 
individuals show impaired processing efficiency as indexed by longer latencies on correct 
anti-saccades and that these latencies are even longer when threatening stimuli are used 
(Derakshan et al., 2009).  These findings support the prediction that anxiety interferes 
with the executive ability to inhibit reflexive responses.  Further, one study found that 
HSAs more quickly orient toward facial stimuli on prosaccade tasks and make more 
prosaccadic errors (looking toward the stimulus) on antisaccade tasks (Wieser, Pauli, & 
Mühlberger, 2009).  This supports the use of ACT to generate specific predictions about 
the effects of social anxiety.   
Currently, few studies have examined the predictions of ACT regarding the 
inhibition function using psychophysiological measures.  One notable exception is a 
study using the stop-signal paradigm while measuring EEG desynchronization, changes 
in brain voltage indicating increased activation (Savostyanov et al., 2009).  The stop-
signal paradigm requires subjects to press a button to identify targets with a minority of 
these being followed by a signal indicating that subjects should not press any button, a 
process which requires the suppression of a pre-potent response.  Inefficient inhibition 
was measured as increased EEG desynchronization, which indicates the increased use of 
cortical resources, in high trait anxious individuals versus low trait anxious controls.  
Two other studies have tested the effect of anxiety on inhibition using ERPs (Ansari & 
Derakshan, 2011a, 2011b).  The first of these studies found that trait anxious subjects 
have greater negative ERP deflections than low trait anxious subjects immediately prior 
to successful antisaccades.  Other research has suggested that this negative deflection is 
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associated with the executive effort recruited to inhibit reflexive saccades (Everling, 
Matthews, & Flohr, 2001).  Therefore, these results are interpreted to reflect the 
recruitment of more attentional resources to successfully inhibit stimulus-driven 
orientation toward the distracter.  The second study used a mixed antisaccade task, which 
requires subjects to shift between prosaccades and antisaccades as cued by the color of 
the fixation cross.  The researchers examined the amplitude of the contingent negative 
variation (CNV), an ERP waveform associated with anticipation of a cued stimulus and 
response preparation (see Bender, Resch, Weisbrod, & Oelkers-Ax, 2004; Rösler, Heil, & 
Röder, 1997).  This study observed greater CNV amplitude in high trait anxious 
participants after cue offset compared to low trait-anxious individuals.  This suggests that 
high trait-anxious individuals must exert greater attentional effort in order to maintain 
performance.  Thus, both of these studies support impaired processing efficiency in high 
trait anxious individuals when engaging inhibitory processes. 
Shifting 
In comparison to studies testing the impairment of inhibition hypothesis, fewer 
studies have tested the predictions of ACT regarding the shifting function.  Research 
predating ACT, however, provides an empirical basis for this hypothesis.  For example, 
Goodwin and Sher (1992) found that anxiety predicted impaired efficiency and 
effectiveness for the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task.  This task requires subjects to choose 
one of four cards that match a standard card on one of a number of shared features.  
Occasionally, the rule by which the cards match is changed, and subjects must determine 
the new rule and utilize it until it changes again.  Although Miyake and colleagues (2000) 
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identify this task as primarily utilizing the shifting function, it is not a high resolution 
measure of shifting effectiveness. 
Other studies also suggest that the shifting process is affected by anxiety.  In a test 
of simple mathematical calculations, Derakshan, Smyth, and Eysenck (2009) found that 
high levels of state anxiety predicted longer response times when participants were 
required to switch between mathematical operations.  Other studies have utilized 
prospective memory tasks which test the ability to execute conditional responses to a 
delayed low-salience cue.  These studies suggest that highly anxious individuals are more 
likely to make errors on prospective memory tasks (e.g., Cockburn & Smith, 1994; Harris 
& Cumming, 2003; Harris & Menzies, 1999).   
Saccade tasks have been useful in the investigation of shifting as well.  Ansari and 
colleagues (2008) compared performance on mixed (or cued) antisaccade/prosaccade 
trials to single-task prosaccade or antisaccade blocks.  Mixed antisaccade tasks have been 
found to result in improvement in the antisaccade trials (e.g., Cherkasova, Manoach, 
Intriligator, & Barton, 2002).  This is thought to occur because mixed-trial blocks provide 
updated instructions between trials via the cues, thus prompting attention toward the goal 
of the task.  Single-task blocks give instructions only at the beginning of the block, thus 
the attention given to the goal is thought to diminish throughout the trial (De Jong, 
Berendsen, & Cools, 1999).   As expected, Ansari and colleagues (2008) observed these 
counter-intuitive faster antisaccade latencies during mixed-trials in low anxious 
individuals.  However, high anxious individuals did not perform faster on mixed-trial 
versus single-task antisaccades.  This suggests that high-trait anxious individuals have 
fewer attentional resources available to attend to the goal during tasks requiring shifting.  
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Overall, this research supports the predictions of ACT that anxiety impairs the efficiency 
of shifting attention. 
Event-related Potentials 
 Derakshan and Eysenck (2010) describe ideal tests measuring processing 
efficiency as possessing three main qualities: 1) a paradigm in which anxiety may be 
probed during the performance of a primary task, 2) non-significant or partialed out 
effects for performance effectiveness, and 3) documentation of brain activity.  These 
criteria were used to inform the research design of the present study.  The current study 
met the first criterion by including a task-irrelevant threat cue in 20% of trials.  
Processing efficiency and effectiveness were operationalized as latency and proportion of 
correct responses to incorrect responses, respectively.  Additionally, ERPs were used to 
measure these constructs, thus providing a robust measure of the time at which cognitive 
processes occur and of the resources dedicated to these processes.  Thus the use of ERPs 
met both the second and third criteria. 
ERPs are electrical signals generated from the summation of cortical action 
potentials involved in specific cognitive processes.  They are derived from 
electroencephalography (EEG), the electrical activity of the brain recorded at the scalp 
with a network of electrodes (usually 10-256).  EEG measures changes in voltage 
between each active electrode and a reference electrode, usually located at the earlobe or 
mastoid.  Because use of a single reference site exposes the voltage to contamination 
from activity near the reference, an average between two sites (e.g., both earlobes) is 
sometimes used as a reference (Luck, 2005).  The EEG signal is amplified by three to 
five orders of magnitude because its amplitude is so low (< 100 μV).  As is the case for 
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all bioelectrical measures, the sampling rate of EEG is determined using the Nyquist 
Theorem, which states that the sampling rate should be at least twice the highest 
frequency in the signal.  Setting the sampling rate too low can result in aliasing (i.e., 
sampling is insufficient to detect important voltage changes).  In order to derive ERPs, 
the sampling rate is usually set between 200 and 1,000 Hz (i.e., 200 – 1,000 samples per 
second).  As the EEG is sampled, the signal is filtered to remove frequencies that fall 
below or exceed voltage thresholds which neural signals are unlikely to reach.  The lower 
threshold is typically set between .01 and .1 Hz, and the high cutoff is usually set 
between 15 and 100 Hz.  Filtering requires great care as it can distort the latency of ERPs 
(Luck, unpublished manuscript; Luck, 2005).   
ERPs are classified into two major categories.  Those occurring soon after (e.g., < 
300ms) the presentation of a stimulus are typically known as exogenous potentials.  
These early components are dependent on the stimulus characteristics, whereas later 
endogenous potentials are associated with executive functions (Luck, 2005; Näätänen, 
1992).   
Endogenous ERPs are frequently used to draw conclusions regarding conscious 
processing of the stimulus in processes such as recognition, categorization, response 
generation, and expectation violation (Luck, 2005).  The most commonly studied of the 
endogenous ERPs is the P3b (also known as the P3 or P300), a positive spike occurring 
450-600 ms after the stimulus.  The P3b seems to be sensitive to local probability as 
indicated by enhanced amplitude at stimulus presentation for oddball stimuli.  P3b 
amplitude is smaller and occurs later if a subject is uncertain about how to categorize a 
stimulus.  This reflects the increased recruitment of attentional resources (Kok, 2001; 
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Polich, 2007).  In dual-task paradigms, diminished attention to the secondary task is 
associated with reduced P3b amplitude to secondary task stimuli (Nash & Fernandez, 
1996).  For example, Murray and Janelle (2007) found that high state anxious individuals 
required to drive quickly in a driving simulator demonstrated reduced P3b amplitudes to 
probes in a secondary visual detection task.  Although lap speed indicated that these 
individuals did not experience performance deficits, reduced P3b amplitudes reflected an 
increase in attentional demands for detecting visual probes in the secondary task.     
Another useful endogenous component for studying processing efficiency is the 
CNV, a slow-wave sustained negative deflection that occurs between a warning and a 
target stimulus.  (Luck, 2005).  Studies examining vigilant attention have found that 
increased amplitude of the early contingent negative variation (CNV) occurred in both 
state and trait anxious subjects compared to normal controls when cued to expect 
negative stimuli (Carretié et al., 2004).  More interestingly, the CNV has been used to test 
predictions of ACT.  Ansari and Derakshan (2011a) found that greater CNV amplitudes 
were elicited in high trait anxious individuals compared to low anxious individuals while 
anticipating a cued stimulus.   
There are several benefits to using ERPs.  First, they are a relatively non-invasive 
technique for examining brain activity.  Secondly, many ERPs do not require the subject 
to perform an overt behavior.  In cases where a behavior is elicited, ERPs are a highly 
accurate measure of cognitive response time and are uncontaminated with variations in 
motor response time.  ERPs give high temporal resolution for the occurrence of these 
processes.  For these reasons, ERPs are commonly used to minimize measurement error 
in the study of cognitive processes, such as attention.  Various studies testing attentional 
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biases in SAD (Kolassa et al., 2007, 2009; Mueller et al., 2009; Sachs et al., 2004; van 
Peer, Spinhoven, & Roelofs, 2010; ) and the effects of trait anxiety on attention (Ansari 
& Derakshan, 2011a, 2011b; Bar-Haim et al., 2005; Dennis & Chen, 2007, 2008; Murray 
& Janelle, 2007; Righi et al., 2009) have used ERPs to measure processing efficiency.  
Therefore, this study examined ERP components associated with the efficiency of 
attentional control.  Specifically, the CNV and P3b components were examined.  The 
CNV is of interest to the current study because it is a measure of executive resources 
recruited in anticipation of a cued stimulus.  The P3b decreases and appears later as more 
attentional resources are devoted to a task (Kok, 2001).  Therefore, attentional control 
theory predicts that the CNV should be larger and later and the P3b should be smaller and 
later for HSAs compared to LSAs in response to threat cues. 
Current Study 
Cognitive models of SAD predict that attentional biases (i.e., self-focused 
attention and hypervigilance) lead to performance deficits on any concurrently performed 
task (Barlow, 2002; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Schultz & 
Heimberg, 2008), yet they lack specificity regarding how this occurs.  Attentional control 
theory (Eysenck, 2007) posits that anxious individuals maintain performance 
effectiveness by recruiting more attentional resources, thus diminishing processing 
efficiency.  Although extensive research has been conducted to test the predictions of 
ACT for trait anxiety, relatively little has been done to examine the implications of this 
theory for specific anxiety disorders.  Only two studies (Amir & Bomyea, 2011; Wieser, 
Pauli, & Mühlberger, 2009) have tested the predictions of ACT in a socially anxious 
sample.  Thus, evidence that attentional control theory bears any relevance to SAD is 
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currently insubstantial.  Therefore, the current study aimed to expand knowledge about 
attentional biases in SAD by testing the predictions of ACT in a socially anxious sample.  
This study predicted that self-focused attention and hypervigilance in SAD would 
preoccupy attentional resources used by the inhibition and shifting functions of the 
central executive.  It was predicted that this would result in reduced processing 
efficiency.   
Secondly, the current study used methodology that advances basic knowledge 
regarding attentional control theory by utilizing psychophysiological measures, 
specifically ERPs.  The majority of studies examining ACT have focused on behavioral 
measures, despite theoretical and empirical rationale to use approaches which more 
directly measure cognitive processes (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2010; Handy et al., 2001; 
Mueller et al., 2009).  Therefore, a secondary goal of this study is to expand the 
psychophysiological literature testing attentional control theory. 
The current study compared HSAs and LSAs in a mixed antisaccade task.  Each 
subject executed cued prosaccades and antisaccades.  The cue indicated social threat in 
20% of trials.  It was hypothesized that the CNV would be amplified, reflecting impaired 
processing efficiency, in HSAs compared to LSAs and that this would especially be the 
case during threat cues.  Further, the current study predicted that the task in general 
would elicit diminished P3b amplitude and later P3b latency in HSAs, but not LSAs, 
indicating increased devotion of attentional resources, and that this effect would be more 
pronounced in the presence of threat cues.  These predictions were made for both repeat 
(instructions maintained) antisaccade trials, indicating impaired efficiency of inhibition, 
and switch (instructions changed) prosaccade trials, reflecting impairment of the shifting 
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function.  Further, it was predicted that delayed saccade latencies would occur in HSAs 








A minimum sample size of 15 subjects per group (HSA and LSA) was calculated 
based on the effect sizes of similar research designs (e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a) 
and Cohen’s (1988) procedures to determine power.  Participants were recruited using the 
undergraduate subject pool at a large Midwestern university.  A measure of social anxiety 
(i.e., Social Interaction Anxiety Scale) was completed as part of a pre-screener.  Those 
scoring at least one standard deviation above the mean (i.e., ≥ 30) or no greater than the 
mean (i.e., ≤ 19) for an undergraduate normalization sample (Mattick and Clarke, 1998) 
qualified for the study and were sent study invitations.  The SIAS was readministered 
prior to the experiment, and cutoffs identical to the qualification criteria were used to 
divide participants into high (HSA) and low social anxiety (LSA) groups.  The sample 
mean SIAS score was 26.31, with a means of 11.63 and 41.00 for the LSA and HSA 
groups, respectively.     
Materials 
Demographics Form. A self-report questionnaire was used to gather participant’s 
demographic information, including age, sex, and education level. 
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Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1989). The SIAS is a 
20-item measure that assesses the extent that individuals experience social fears when 
interacting with others. It is a widely used measure of social anxiety symptoms assessed 
on a five point scale with higher symptoms indicating higher levels of social anxiety.  
Internal consistency was high for the current study, α = .95. 
 Center for Epidemiological Studies Scale for Depression (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). 
The CES-D is a 20-item questionnaire which assesses the frequency and intensity of 
common symptoms of depression over the previous week.  Response options range from 
0 = rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day), to 3 = most or all of the time (5-7 days).  
Cronbach’s alpha was .90 for the current study. 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & 
Parkes,1982).  The CFQ is a 25-item questionnaire with items rated on a 0 (never) to 4 
(very often) Likert scale.  It measures the frequency of commonly occurring minor 
cognitive errors in daily activities.  For the current study, internal consistency was high, α 
= .93. 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Form Y (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).  The STAI consists of two 20-item measures of state and trait 
anxiety.  Form Y is an updated version of the original measure (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & 
Lushene, 1970) and was developed in order to more validly measure the constructs.  
Cronbach’s alpha was .92 for the Trait Subscale and .93 for the State Subscale in the 
current study. 
Attentional Control Scale (ATTC; Derryberry & Reed, 2002).  The attentional 
control scale is a 20-item measure of attentional control which measures two factors, 
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attentional focusing and shifting.  For the current study, only the total score was used as 
the subscales have not yet been validated.  Each item is rated on a Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (almost never) to 4 (always).  The scale had acceptable internal consistency in the 
current study, α = .82 
Procedure 
Participants completed measures online prior to a mixed antisaccade task.  Cue 
and stimulus latency and position were patterned after that used by Ansari and Derakshan 
(2011a, 2011b).  Participants were then seated before a computer monitor, and an EEG 
cap, heart rate electrodes, and EOG electrodes were applied.  Task instructions were 
communicated verbally before each block.  Participants completed a mixed-antisaccade 
task consisting of four blocks with 100 trials each (see Fig. 1).  Trials began with a 
fixation cross (+) indicating that the participant should focus visual attention on that 
location until the peripheral stimulus appeared (duration = 1300 ms).  The fixation cross 
then changed color for 300 ms to serve as a cue.  Response directives (prosaccade vs. 
antisaccade) were indicated by the color (yellow vs. blue) to which the fixation cross 
transformed (see Fig. 1).  Participants were instructed beforehand to look at the oval that 
appeared after the cue for prosaccade directives and to look at the side of the monitor 
opposite the oval on antisaccade trials.  Additionally, self-focused attention was 
manipulated using a color congruent circle which appeared around the fixation cross on 
20% of trials.  Prior to the first block, the experimenter told the subject that there was a 
glitch in the program which would cause a circle to appear around the fixation cross if the 
subject’s heart rate increased.  Following the cue, a blank screen appeared for 400 ms 
followed by the appearance of the stimulus, a grey oval, for a duration of 600 ms on 
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either the left or right side of the screen.  Intertrial intervals were varied between 300 ms, 
600 ms, and 900 ms in order to prevent the elicitation of alpha waves in the EEG (Luck, 
2005).  In line with a similar study (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a), participants completed 
four blocks consisting of approximately 100 trials each. 
          
Fig.1 Mixed Antisaccade Task                                       
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Eye-tracking. 
Horizontal saccades were measured following the conventions used by Ansari and 
Derakshan (2011a, 2011b), and saccade data was collected using BIOPAC Systems 
MP150 Hardware and AcqKnowledge Software.  Electrodes were placed on the outer 
canthi of each eye.  Horizontal electrooculogram (HEOG) voltage changes from baseline 
>  50 μv were used to identify saccade initiation.  Saccade direction was indicated by 







collected as DC without the use of high-pass filtering in order to prevent the attenuation 
of the signal.  The standard procedure of eliminating initial saccades with latencies less 
than 80 ms or greater than 500 ms was followed (see Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a, 2011b; 
Fischer & Weber, 1993) in order to exclude pre-perceptual saccades and outliers.  The 
current study predicted that initial saccade onset for correct trials would occur later in 
HSAs than LSAs and that this effect would be larger during threat manipulation.  This 
prediction was based on previous research which observed delayed correct saccades in a 
sample with high trait anxiety, and interpreted this as impaired processing efficiency 
(Ansari & Derakshan, 2011).    
Eye-movement analyses were restricted to the first saccade of each trial to occur 
after stimulus presentation.  Saccades were identified using EOGUI (Hofmann, 
Schleicher, Galley, & Golz, 2011) a software designed to operate in MATLAB.  Saccade 
onset was defined as the moment at which the velocity of eye-movement first exceeded 
40 degrees per second.  After this, a low-pass filter was used to identify plateaus in the 
signal indicative of saccades.  Saccades were required to meet these and other standard 
criteria used by EOGUI (Hofmann et al., 2011).   
Electroencephalography. 
EEG data was collected using BIOPAC Systems MP150 Hardware and 
AcqKnowledge Software.   An electrode cap (Electro-Cap International Inc.) was applied 
using the international 10-20 method for electrode placement.  Data was collected from 
nine channels (FZ, F3, F4, CZ, C3, C4, PZ, P3, and P4) which were grounded by a mid-
frontal electrode.  All channels were referenced using the averaged mastoids technique 
(see Luck, 2005).  Data were sampled at 250 Hz in accord with the Nyquist Theorem and 
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filtered such that signals below .1 Hz and above 35 Hz were attenuated.  Blinks were 
detected using an electrode below the right eye which shared a reference with the EEG 
electrodes.   
Event-related potentials. 
For the mixed antisaccade task, ERPs were event-locked to the onset of the 
imperative cue (i.e., fixation cross changes to blue or yellow).  A digital TTL signal was 
sent from the PC presenting the stimulus to the PC recording the data in order to mark 
events.  Data were epoched into 1000 ms segments beginning 200 ms before cue onset in 
order to obtain a baseline.  Trials during which saccades occurred between cue offset and 
stimulus onset were thrown out in order to prevent the contamination of the ERPs with 
EMG associated with eye movement and ERPs associated with motion-perception (Luck, 
2005; Luck & Girelli, 1998).  Artifact detection, rejection, and data analyses were done 
using EEGLAB, version 9 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & 
Luck, 2010).  
Artifact rejection was done in four automated phases and a manual phase.  Phase 
one involved the use of an automatic script in ERPLAB to reject trials on which voltage 
exceeded  100 μV.  This rejected an average of .2% (   = .9%) of trials.  In the second 
phase, a moving window peak-to-peak threshold was used to identify and reject trials.  
This script identifies voltage changes exceeding 100 μV within a moving 200 ms window 
which progress through each trial in increments of 50 ms.  This resulted in the rejection 
of an average of .3% (SD = 1.0%) of trials.  The third phase consisted of blink rejection 
by a routine which examined the vEOG channel.  This resulted in the rejection of 3.3% of 
trials on average (SD = 5.0%).  Phase four consisted of a function which identified 
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saccades on the hEOG channel and resulted in the removal of an average of .4% (SD = 
1.4%) of trials.  Finally, manual artifact detection was conducted on the remaining trials.  
Eye-blinks were suggested by sudden positive peaks restricted to the frontal channels and 
negative valleys in the vEOG, and these trials were removed.  Trials on which hEOG 
activity suggested eye-movements were also removed, as were trials consisting of 
excessive noise or other artifacts.  This resulted in the removal of an average of 8.9% of 
trials (SD = 8.5%).   
Manipulation Check. 
The self-focused attention manipulation was checked following the approach used 
by Papageorgiou and Wells (2002).  The credibility of the heart rate feedback was 
evaluated by asking participants after the experiment if they could recall what the circle 
around the fixation cross indicated.  Subjects also rated how much they believed that the 
heart rate feedback affected their self-consciousness and performance on a scale from 0 
(not at all) to 7 (extremely). 
Operational definitions. 
Inhibition was operationally defined as the trials which required an antisaccade 
following a previous antisaccade trial (i.e., repeat saccade trials).  Antisaccade trials 
following prosaccade trials were not included because they are confounded with a shift in 
instructions (i.e., shifting).  Inefficiency of inhibition was measured as increased CNV 
amplitude in the inter-stimulus interval preceding inhibition trials.  In line with previous 
research, greater CNV amplitude was interpreted as the recruitment of compensatory 
resources in order to maintain performance (see Ansari & Derakshan, 2011b).  
Inefficiency of inhibition was further operationalized as diminished P3b amplitude and 
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delayed P3b onset (see Kok, 2001).  Additionally, delayed onset of correct saccades was 
interpreted as impaired processing efficiency.  Effectiveness of inhibition was measured 
as the ratio of correct to incorrect saccades on inhibition trials (see Ansari et al., 2008; 
Cherkasova et al., 2002). 
Shifting was defined as prosaccade trials which followed antisaccade trials (i.e., 
switch prosaccade trials).  By excluding switch antisaccade trials, shifting was not 
confounded with inhibition.  The markers of inefficiency were identical to those 
described above for inhibition.  
Analytical Approach 
The current study used a mixed design with factors for social anxiety (HSA, 
LSA), self-focused attention condition (threat, no threat), executive function (shifting, 
inhibition) and measured multiple outcomes (CNV amplitude, CNV latency, P3b 
amplitude, P3b latency, initial saccade latency, and ration of correct to incorrect initial 
saccades).  Therefore, the data was analyzed using a series of repeated measures factorial 
ANOVAs.  Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments were used to follow 
significant interactions. 
 Before analyzing the data, analyses were conducted to ensure that the assumptions 
of the statistical methods used were not violated.  Assumptions for mixed designs include 
normality of the sampling distributions, equal variance between groups, and sphericity.  
Because reaction time data is characteristically skewed, saccades occurring more than 
500 ms post-stimulus were excluded (see Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a).  Further, nearly 
equal sample sizes in the levels of the independent variables, at least 20 df in the group 
error term, and the use of a two-tailed test are necessary to meet normality assumptions 
and were generally followed.  Mauchly’s test was be used to evaluate sphericity, and 
42 
 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used in all cases of violations of the sphericity 
assumption.   
 Effect size was calculated using eta squared following significant effects.  In 
accord with statistical conventions, the current study considered .02 to be a small effect 
size, .13 to be medium, and .26 to be large.   
Hypothesis 1 
 The current study hypothesized that HSAs would experience larger and later CNV 
amplitude during threatening cues and compared to LSAs.  To examine this, independent 
2 (Group: HSA, LSA) × 2 (Condition: Threat, Non-Threat) × 2 (Function: Shifting, 
Inhibition) × 6 (Site: FZ, F3, F4, CZ, C3, C4) mixed ANOVAs were used to examine 
amplitude and latency.  In order to reduce the risk of spurious results, only frontal and 
central sites were examined, as the CNV maximizes at these sites (Luck, 2005). 
Hypothesis 2 
 A diminished and later P3b was expected to occur in the presence of threat cues 
for the HSA group and compared to the LSAs across conditions.  These predictions were 
tested using 2 (Group: HSA, LSA) × 2 (Condition: Threat, Non-Threat) × 2 (Function: 
Shifting, Inhibition) × 3 (Site: PZ, P3, P4) mixed ANOVAs to examine amplitude and 
latency.  Only parietal sites were analyzed as the P3b maximizes there. 
Hypothesis 3 
 It was predicted that HSAs would demonstrate increased saccade latency in the 
presence of threat cues.  Further, it was predicted that this effect would be larger for 
inhibition versus shifting trials.  A 2 (Group: HSA, LSA) × 2 (Condition: Threat, Non-
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Thirty-two (16 HSA, 16 LSA) participated comprised the final sample.  Of those 
who participated, thirteen subjects were excluded because they did not meet the SIAS 
cutoff criteria for the groups (i.e., >19 and < 30).  Six more were excluded because of 
high impedances (i.e., > 10 KΩ) or equipment malfunction.  Of the thirty-two remaining 
participants, 14 were male (44%) and 18 were female (56%).  The mean age of the 
sample was 19.78 (SD =1.29).  Twenty-one participants identified as Caucasian (65.6%), 
5 as African-American (15.6%), 2 as Asian (6.3%), 2 as Hispanic or Latina/o (6.3%), 1 as 
Native American (3.1%), and 1 as another race (3.1%).  The HSA and LSA groups did 
not differ by sex, χ
2
(1) = .51, p = .48, age, t(30) = .14, p  = .89, or ethnicity, χ
2
(5) = 4.23, 
p = .52.  They did not differ on self-reported attentional control as measured by the ACS, 
but HSAs scored significantly higher on the CES-D, CFQ, and STAI (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Comparison of HSA and LSA Groups on Self-Report Measures. 
 
 HSA LSA Comparisons 
Variables M SD  M SD  t  df p 
ACS 46.63 9.66 51.19 8.60 1.41 30 .169 
CES-D 20.06 11.25 9.88 9.22 2.80 30 .009 
CFQ 44.33 16.11 30.19 18.69 2.25 29 .032 
STAI-S 29.20 11.23 19.69 9.57 2.55 29 .017 
STAI-T 36.25 8.93 25.69 11.89 2.84 30 .008 
 
Note. ACS = Attentional Control Scale; CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale; CFQ = Cognitive Failures Questionnaire; STAI-S & STAI-T = State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory State and Trait Subscales, respectively 
 
Manipulation Check 
 After the experiment, the majority of participants (30) were able to recall that the 
circles which appeared on some trials indicated increased heart rate.  An independent 
samples t-test was conducted to evaluate differences between HSAs and LSAs in self-
reported reactions to the heart rate feedback manipulation.  There were significant 
differences between groups in self-report of self-consciousness, t(28) = 2.77, p= .01, and 
interference with task performance, t(28) = 2.59, p = .015.  HSAs rated their self-
consciousness during these trials to be higher (M = 4.21, SD = 1.05) than did LSAs (M = 
2.56, SD = 2.00).  Similarly, the HSA group reported that the appearance of the circle 
caused more interference with the ability to do the task (M = 2.71, SD = 1.33) compared 
to the LSA group (M = 1.44, SD = 1.05). 
Eye-tracking 
The ratio of correct to incorrect saccades for shifting and inhibition trials was 
significantly different, χ
2
(2) = 26.05, p < .001, with more errors being made on inhibition 
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trials (37.83%) than on shifting trials (25.66%).  The proportion of correct to incorrect 
saccades differed by group, χ
2
(1) = 85.31, p < .001, such that LSAs made significantly 
more errors (29.24%) than did HSAs (20.15%).  There was not a significant difference 
between threat and non-threat trials, χ
2
(1) = .36, p = .55.   
Mean correct onset times for each subject were calculated for inhibition and 
shifting trials.  A 2 (Group [HSA, LSA]) × 2 (Condition [Threat, Non-Threat]) × 2 
(Function [Inhibition, Shifting]) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant interaction 
between Function and Condition, F(1,30) =6.57, p = .016, η
2
 = .18.  Simple effects 
analysis indicated that saccade onset was later for inhibition trials during threat (M = 
212.98, SD = 27.54) compared to non-threat trials (M = 199.68, SD = 28.91; d = .49), 
F(1,30) = 11.33, p = .002,   
  = .27.  The main effect of function was significant, F(1,30) 
= 61.13, p < .001, η
2
 = .67, such that saccade onset was later for inhibition trials (M = 
206.33, SD = 27.10) than for shifting trials (M =165.67, SD = 21.72; d = 1.71).  There 
also was a main effect for Group (see Fig. 2), F(1,30) =6.63, p = .015, η
2
 = .18, such that 
HSAs had significantly later saccade onset (M = 200.33, SD = 31.48) compared to LSAs 
(M = 171.67, SD = 31.48; d = .91).   
Event-related Potentials 
For the ERP analyses (see Fig. 3), only sites at which the P3b (parietal sites) and 
CNV (frontal and central sites) typically maximize were analyzed in order to reduce the 
risk of spurious results (Luck, 2005).  In order to isolate the P3b, mean amplitude for 
each parietal site was calculated using a 300-500 ms post-cue window.  A 2 (Group 
[HSA, LSA]) × 2 (Condition [Threat, Non-Threat]) × 2 (Function [Inhibition, Shifting] ) 
× 3 (Site [PZ, P3, P4]) mixed ANOVA was used to evaluate hypothesis 1 regarding P3b 
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amplitude.  No interactions between the factors were significant.  There was a significant 
main effect for Condition, F(1,30) = 21.62, p < .001, η
2
 = .42, such that P3b amplitude 
for frequent non-threatening trials (M = .70, SD = .32) was lower compared to rare threat 
trials (M = 1.27, SD = .59).  There also was a main effect for Function, F(1,30) = 12.80, p 
< .001, η
2
 = .30, such that P3b amplitude was larger for shifting (M = 1.17, SD = .51) 
than for inhibition trials (M = .80, SD = .40).  The main effect for Site was significant, 
F(2,60) = 17.69, p < .001, η
2
 = .37.  Pairwise comparisons showed that amplitude at site 
P3 (M = .83, SD = .39) was significantly smaller compared to PZ (M = 1.09, SD = .42) 
and P4 (M = 1.03, SD = .46), and that amplitude between these two sites was not 
significantly different (p = .41).  As was hypothesized, there was a significant main effect 
for Group, F(1,30) = 5.56, p = .025, η
2
 = .16, such that HSAs (M = .74, SD = .58) had 
lower P3b amplitudes compared to LSAs (M = 1.23, SD = .58).   
Fifty percent fractional area latency was used to assess relative latency differences 
while minimizing the influence of noise (Luck, 2005).  Negative values were zeroed to 
prevent negative components from overlapping with the windowing period.  This resulted 
in three subjects (2 LSA, 1 HSA) lacking a clear P3b waveform for one or more trial 
types, and they were thus removed from these analyses.  A 2 (Group [HSA, LSA]) × 2 
(Condition [Threat, Non-Threat]) × 2 (Function [Inhibition, Shifting]) × 3 (Site [PZ, P3, 
P4]) mixed ANOVA was used to evaluate latency differences.  There was a significant 
interaction between Group and Condition, F(1,27) = 8.63, p = .007, η
2
 = .24.  Simple 
effects analysis revealed that, as hypothesized, HSAs had later P3b onset for threat trials 
(M = 397.59, SD = 24.00) compared to non-threat trials (M = 383.79, SD = 21.10), 
F(1,27) = 5.43, p = .028,   
  = .17, although there were no differences for LSAs (p = .08).  
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The interaction of Condition and Site also was significant, F(1.6,42.3) = 4.32, p = .03.  
However, no simple effects were significant after applying Bonferroni adjustments.  
There were no other significant effects. 
In order to isolate the CNV, the data was initially planned to be windowed around 
the interval between cue offset and 100 ms after stimulus presentation (see Ansari & 
Derakshan, 2011a).  An examination of waveform plots showed that negative shifts were 
in progress as long as 100 ms post cue offset.  In order to prevent contamination of the 
CNV by this shift, the data were windowed 100-400 ms post cue offset.   
A 2 (Group [HSA, LSA]) × 2 (Condition [Threat, Non-Threat]) × 2 (Function 
[Inhibition, Shifting]) × 6 (Site [FZ, F3, F4, CZ, C3, C4]) mixed ANOVA was used to 
evaluate the hypothesis that HSAs would show stronger CNV potentiation.  There was a 
significant three-way interaction between Group, Condition, and Function, F(1,54) = 
6.23, p = .018, η
2
 = .17.  Simple effects analysis revealed that the HSA group (M = -2.39, 
SD = 2.84) had greater negativity compared to the LSA group (M = .16, SD = 2.84) for 
non-threat inhibition trials, F(1,30) = 6.47, p = .016,   
  = .18.  The three-way interaction 
between Condition, Function, and Site also was significant, F(5,54) = 3.72, p = .003, η
2
 = 
.11.  Multivariate simple effects analysis suggested that negativity at FZ (M = -2.19, SD = 
2.47) was significantly larger compared to the other frontal sites, F3 (M = -1.11, SD = 
2.29) and F4 (M = -.87, SD = 2.40) as well as C4 (M = -.34, SD = 1.91) for non-threat 
inhibition trials, F(5,26) = 9.37, p < .001,   
  = .64.  For non-threat shifting trials, FZ (M = 
-.17, SD = .54) was significantly more negative compared to the peripheral central sites 
C3 (M = .18, SD = .42) and C4 (M = .16, SD = .44), F(5,26) = 9.00, p < .001,   
  = .63.  
For threat inhibition trials, negative amplitude was significantly greater at FZ (M = -.43, 
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SD = .69) compared to F4 (M = -.06, SD = .75), C4 (M = .02, SD = .67), and C3 (M = -
.01, SD = .61), F(5,26) = 6.58, p < .001,   
  = .56.  Potentials during threat shifting trials 
were lower at frontal sites FZ (M = .47, SD = 5.28), F4 (M = 1.18, SD = 5.09) and F3 (M 
= .86, SD = 4.90) compared to C4 (M = 3.04, SD = 4.59), F(5,26) = 7.45, p < .001,   
  = 
.59.  There also was a significant Threat by Site interaction, F(5,84.17) = 4.02, p = .012, 
but this was not probed given that these factors also interacted with Function.  Similarly, 
the significant interaction between Function and Site was not probed, F(5,86) = 4.64, p  = 
.005.  There was a main effect for Condition, F(1,30) = 4.63, p = .04, η
2
 = .13, indicating 
that greater negativity was associated with non-threat trials (M = -.55, SD = 1.08) 
compared to threat trials (M = .83, SD = 2.57).  The main effect of Function was 
significant, F(1,30) = 6.83, p = .014, η
2
 = .19, suggesting that negativity was greater for 
inhibition trials (M = -.63, SD = 1.12) than for shifting trials (M = .91, SD = 2.44).  There 
also were significant differences between the electrode sites, F(5,63) = 5.89, p = .004,   
  
= .16.  Multiple pairwise comparisons revealed that the frontal midline site FZ (M = -.58, 
SD = 1.75) was more negative compared to frontal peripheral sites F3 (M = -.11, SD = 
1.64) and F4 (M = .07, SD = 1.64), as well as the central peripheral sites, C3 (M = .41, 
SD = .1.40) and C4 (M = .72, SD = 1.42).  Frontal compared to central negativity was 
also more pronounced on both sides of the scalp.  Amplitude at CZ did not differ 
significantly from other sites.  Thus, negativity was maximized frontocentrally, which is 
consistent with CNV activity.  Finally, there was a main effect for Group, F(1,30) = 4.87, 
p = .035, η
2
 = .14, such that HSAs had a significantly larger negative potentiation (M = -
.69, SD = 2.12) compared to LSAs (M = .97, SD = 2.12).   
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Fractional area latency analyses could not be conducted to isolate CNV latency 
because the CNV lasted beyond the data collection window in most cases.  Additionally, 
the CNV shares several properties with the LRP which make onset calculation difficult, 
namely, the CNV emerges gradually and is characterized by noisy oscillations which are 
relatively long-lasting compared to most other ERPs (Miller, Patterson, & Ulrich, 1998).  
Therefore, CNV latency was measured using 50% fractional negative peak latency 
between 250 and 800 ms.  Miller and colleagues (1998) used jackknifing to assess this 
method for estimating the LRP, a similar slow-wave potential, and found that it provided 
accurate estimates of waveform onset in most cases.   
In order to evaluate CNV onset differences, a 2 (Group [HSA, LSA]) × 2 
(Condition [Threat, Non-Threat]) × 2 (Function [Inhibition, Shifting]) × 6 (Site [FZ, F3, 
F4, CZ, C3, C4]) mixed ANOVA was conducted.  There was a significant three-way 
interaction between Group, Condition, and Function, F(1,30) = 10.67, p = .003, η
2
 = .26.  
Simple effects analysis revealed that, as hypothesized, HSAs showed significantly later 
CNV onset (M = 603.74, SD = 96.56) than did LSAs (M = 454.87, SD = 96.56) for 
shifting trials during threat, F(1,30) = 19.01, p < .001,   
  = .39.  The interaction of Group 
and Function was significant, F(1,30) = 4.94, p = .034, η
2
 = .14, and simple effects 
analysis suggested that HSAs had significantly later CNV onset times for shifting trials 
(M = 569.80, SD = 59.69) compared to LSAs (M = 487.94, SD = 59.69), F(1,30) = 15.05, 
p < .001,   
  = .33.  The interaction of Function and Site was significant, F(4.5,134.1) = 
3.10, p = .01, η
2
 = .09.   Multivariate simple effects analysis revealed differences between 
sites for inhibition trials, F(5,26) = 6.69, p < .001,   
  = .56, such that CNV onset was 
slower at FZ (M = 574.89, SD = 67.32) compared to F3 (M =501.08, SD = 65.4) and that 
51 
 
it was slower at C4 (M = 589.11, SD = 75.74) compared to F3 and CZ (M = 518.90, SD = 
98.48).  There was a main effect for Site, F(3.8,114.9) = 3.63, p = .009, η
2
 = .11.  
Pairwise comparisons revealed that CNV onset was significantly faster at F3 (M = 
511.29, SD = 54.60) compared to C4 (M = 570.48, SD = 62.68).  Finally, there was a 
main effect for Group, F(1,30) = 5.42, p = .027, η
2
 = .15, such that onset of CNV was 
significantly later for HSAs (M = 562.04, SD = 63.08) compared to LSAs (M = 510.14, 
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The goal of the current study was to test the joint predictions of attentional control 
theory and cognitive models of social anxiety in a socially anxious sample.  Overall, the 
findings supported the hypotheses and suggested impaired processing efficiency in the 
socially anxious group compared to the non-anxious control group.  The socially anxious 
group showed impaired efficiency of attentional control as indexed by later onset of 
saccades for both inhibition and shifting trials, delayed P3b onset during threat compared 
to non-threat trials and delayed CNV onset compared to controls.  This suggested that 
stimulus categorization and initiation of response preparation were delayed (Luck, 2005; 
Rösler et al., 1997).  Reduced P3b amplitude across trial types and greater CNV 
amplitude compared to controls suggested that HSAs exercised more cognitive effort to 
categorize stimuli and prepare a saccadic response (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a; Kok, 
2001; Rösler et al., 1997).  Interestingly, HSAs made fewer errors on inhibition and 
shifting trials, suggesting that they were able to maintain performance despite costs to 
processing efficiency.  These findings are largely consistent with similar tests of 
attentional control theory in trait anxious individuals (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a; b;
Fig. 1 HAS (top) and LSA ERPs 
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 Murray & Janelle, 2007), and support the applicability of this theory for generating 
predictions about social anxiety.   
Variations of the antisaccade task have been used extensively in order to assess 
attentional control (Ansari et al., 2008; Everling et al., 2001; Derakshan et al., 2009).  
Previous studies have defined inhibition as antisaccade trials and shifting as switch trials 
(e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a; b).  However, this approach confounds the two 
processes by including switch antisaccade trials in measuring inhibition.  A review of the 
literature suggests that the operational definitions used for inhibition and shifting in the 
current study are novel.  Specifically, inhibition was defined as repeat antisaccade trials, 
and shifting was defined as switch prosaccade trials.  This approach allowed for 
orthogonal definitions.  The results suggested differences between these functions, with 
inhibition trials (compared to shifting) resulting in later onset of correct saccades, 
diminished P3b amplitude, greater CNV amplitude, and later CNV onset, all of which 
suggest that this task places more demands on the central executive.  This is in line with 
previous studies which have found antisaccade trials to be more demanding than 
prosaccade trials (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a; b).  Additional research is needed in order 
to further evaluate this approach to operationalizing the mixed-antisaccade task. 
The results of the current study provide support for the predictions of ACT 
regarding shifting and inhibition in line with the recommendations of Derakshan and 
Eysenck (2010) that such studies include manipulation of anxiety, discrimination 
between performance effectiveness and efficiency, and documentation of neural activity.  
Previous research has provided evidence that anxiety interferes with the efficiency of 
inhibition (Derakshan et al., 2009; Wieser et al., 2009a), but fewer studies have 
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documented this effect for shifting.  The current study found evidence that social anxiety 
impairs efficiency for both of these functions.  These effects were found despite increased 
performance (i.e., correct trials) among HSAs.  This is consistent with ACT, which posits 
that anxiety prompts the recruitment of attentional resources to maintain performance.  
The results contribute to and expand this growing literature. 
The current study also provides evidence in support of cognitive theories of social 
anxiety and provides data which may extend these models (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997).  These models broadly predict that self-focused attention utilizes 
attentional resources, thus increasing cognitive demands.  However, they provide little 
detail concerning the effects of this process or the mechanisms by which it happens.  The 
current study is the third (see Amir & Bomyea, 2011; Wieser et al., 2009a) to test the 
application of attentional control theory to address this gap.  The findings support an 
integrated theory in which self-focused attention results in impaired attentional control.  
Specifically, HSAs showed slowed inhibition and shifting compared to low anxious 
controls.  At the level of neural processes, they showed more effortful allocation of 
attentional resources and impaired processing compared to LSAs (i.e., diminished P3b, 
larger and later onset of CNV amplitude) and impaired processing efficiency (i.e., slowed 
categorization of cues) during interoceptive threat (i.e., later onset of P3b).  As predicted 
by an integration of attentional control theory and cognitive models of social anxiety, this 
suggests that socially anxious individuals recruit more attentional resources to categorize 
stimuli and prepare to make an upcoming response, and that this is especially the case 
during self-focused attention.  The interference of attentional biases with processing 
efficiency and ensuing impairment in social behaviors may serve to perpetuate anxious 
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symptomatology.  Thus, attentional biases and other cognitive processes which impair 
executive control over attention may be important to target in treatment 
There are several limitations to the current study.  An undergraduate convenience 
sample was used rather than a clinical sample.  However, current models suggest that 
social anxiety and its pathological variants are on a continuum rather than being distinct 
categories (Crome, Baillie, Slade, & Ruscio, 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
Furthermore, non-clinical samples are typically used in studies investigating attentional 
control theory, which predicts that even sub-clinical levels of anxiety can interfere with 
information-processing.  Nevertheless, additional research using a clinical sample is 
needed to verify that the results of the current study generalize to the clinical population.  
Another limitation is that the HSA group differed from the LSA group across a number 
of variables.  However, the differences observed are common for socially anxious 
samples, and it is likely that attempts to control for these covariates would reduce the 
generalizability of the results (see Miller & Chapman, 2001).  The HEOG approach to 
eye-tracking represents a third limitation.  This technique is of lower spatial resolution 
compared to video-based eye-tracking.   Future studies are needed in order to test the 
predictions of ACT in a clinical sample using alternative methodology.  
In summary, the current study addresses questions related to attentional control 
theory, cognitive models of social anxiety, and the integration of their predictions.  The 
results generally support these theories and the relevance of attentional control theory to 
models of social anxiety disorder.  The current study suggested that self-focused attention 
may play a role in the impaired attentional control predicted by both theoretical 
perspectives.  It is possible that other processes associated with social anxiety, such as 
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anticipatory processing, play a role in impairing attentional control.  Future research may 
expand upon the current findings by examining the role of this and other cognitive 
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- -  
 
1. What is your sex?  1= Male, 2=Female 
 
2. Age:   (years) 
 
3. Year in School:  
 








Asia, South Pacific 
2 = Puerto Rico 8 = Africa 
3 = Dominican Republic 9 = Europe 
4 = Other Caribbean 10 = Other – Specify: 
5 = Mexico   
6 = Central/South America 99 = Don’t know. 
 
         Specify country of birth if it does not appear above: _____________ 
 
5.   What is your Ethnicity?     
1 = Hispanic/Latino  
2 = Not Hispanic/Latino  








 6.   What is your Race?   
1 = White - not Latino 7 = Mixed (White/Asian) 
2 = African-American 8 = Mixed (other) - Specify: 
3 = Asian   
4 = Latino 9 = Other – Specify: 
5 = Mixed (White/African-
American) 
  
6 = Mixed (White/Hispanic) 99 = Don’t know. 
 
7.   What is your religious affiliation?      
    
1 = Catholic 6 = None 
2 = Protestant 7 = Other – Specify: 
3 = Jewish   
4 = Jehovah’s Witness   
5 = Muslim 99 = Don’t know 
 
8. In all, how many years have you lived in the U.S.?    
 
9. Occupational status:    
    
1 = Employed full-time  
for pay 
8 = Unemployed <6 months,  
does not expect to work 
2 = Employed part-time  
for pay 
9 = Unemployed >6 months, 
does not expect to work 
3 = Homemaker 10 = Laid off 
4 = Full-time student 11 =  Retired 
5 = Leave of absence for medical reasons 
(holding job, plans to  
return to work) 
12 =  Other – Specify: 
_________________ 
6 = Unemployed <6 months, but  
expects to work 
88 = Not Applicable 
7 = Unemployed >6 months, but  
expects to work 
















For each question, please circle a number to indicate the degree to which you feel the statement is 
characteristic or true of you.  The rating scale is as follows: 
 
0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me 3 = Very characteristic or true of me 
1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me 4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me 
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me 
 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
1.  I get nervous if I have to speak with 
someone in authority (teacher, boss, etc.) 
0 1 2 3 4 
2.  I have difficulty making eye-contact with 
others. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3.  I become tense if I have to talk about 
myself or my feelings. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4.  I find difficulty mixing comfortably with 
the people I work with. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5.  I find it easy to make friends of my own 
age. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6.  I tense-up if I meet an acquaintance on the 
street. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7.  When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable. 0 1 2 3 4 
8.  I feel tense if I am alone with just one 
person. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9.  I am at ease meeting people at parties, etc. 0 1 2 3 4 
10.  I have difficulty talking with other people. 0 1 2 3 4 
11.  I find it easy to think of things to talk 
about. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12.  I worry about expressing myself in case I 
appear awkward. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13.  I find it difficult to disagree with 
another’s point of view. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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14.  I have difficulty talking to an attractive 
person of the opposite sex. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15.  I find myself worrying that I won’t know 
what to say in social situations. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16.  I am nervous mixing with people I don’t 
know well. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17.  I feel I’ll say something embarrassing 
when talking. 
0 1 2 3 4 
18.  When mixing in a group, I find myself 
worrying I will be ignored. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19.  I am tense mixing in a group. 0 1 2 3 4 
20.  I am unsure whether to greet someone I 
know only slightly. 






Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved. Please tell me how often you have felt 
this way in the past week. 
DURING THE PAST WEEK 
 Rarely or none    Some or a little            Occasionally or a        Most or all 
    of the time       of the time             moderate amount of time       of the time 
(less than 1 day)                  (1 – 2 days)                           (3 – 4 days)         (5 – 7 days) 
 
 0   1         2    3 
 
 ______  1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me. 
______  2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 
______  3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or  
                  friends. 
______  4. I felt I was just as good as other people. 
______  5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 
______  6. I felt depressed. 
______  7. I felt that everything I did was an effort. 
______  8. I felt hopeful about the future. 
______  9. I thought my life had been a failure. 
______ 10. I felt fearful. 
______ 11. My sleep was restless. 
______ 12. I was happy. 
______ 13. I talked less than usual. 
______ 14. I felt lonely. 




DURING THE PAST WEEK 
Rarely or none    Some or a little                   Occasionally or a     Most or all 
    of the time       of the time           moderate amount of time                   of the time 
(less than 1 day)                    (1 – 2 days)                           (3 – 4 days)     (5 – 7 days) 
 
 0   1         2    3 
 
______ 16. I enjoyed life. 
______ 17. I had crying spells. 
______ 18. I felt sad. 
______ 19. I felt that people dislike me. 
















The following questions are about minor mistakes which everyone makes from time to time, but 
some of which happen more often than others. We want to know how often these things have 
happened to you in the last six months. Please circle the appropriate number. 
0 = Never 
1 = Very rarely  
2 = Occasionally  
3 = Quite often  
4 = Very often 
               
1. Do you read something and find you haven’t been    0    1    2    3    4  
thinking about it and must read it again? 
 
2. Do you find you forgot why you went from one   0    1    2    3    4                   
      part of the house to the other? 
 
3. Do you fail to notice signposts on the road?    0    1    2    3    4      
 
4. Do you find you confuse right and left when giving    0    1    2    3    4      
directions? 
 
5. Do you bump into people?      0    1    2    3    4       
         
6. Do you find you forget whether you’ve turned off    0    1    2    3    4      
a light or a fire or locked the door? 
 
7. Do you fail to listen to people’s names when you    0    1    2    3    4    
 are meeting them?       
     
8. Do you say something and realize afterwards that   0    1    2    3    4     
 it might be taken as insulting? 
 
9. Do you fail to hear people speaking to you when    0    1    2    3    4 
you are doing something else?       
 
10. Do you lose your temper and regret it?    0    1    2    3    4 
       
11. Do you leave important letter unanswered for days?   0    1    2    3    4 
                  
12. Do you find you forget which way to turn on a road   0    1    2    3    4            
      that you know well but rarely use? 
0 = Never 
1 = Very rarely  
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2 = Occasionally  
3 = Quite often  
4 = Very often 
 
13. Do you fail to see what you want in a supermarket   0    1    2    3    4  
      (although it’s there)? 
   
14. Do you find yourself suddenly wondering whether   0    1    2    3    4   
      you’ve used a word correctly? 
   
15. Do you have trouble making up your mind?    0    1    2    3    4  
   
16. Do you find you forget appointments?    0    1    2    3    4  
 
17. Do you forget where you put something like    0    1    2    3    4  
      a newspaper or a book? 
 
18. Do you find that you accidentally throw away the    0    1    2    3    4  
      thing you want and keep what you meant to throw away? 
       (as in the example of throwing away the matchbox and  
       putting the used match in your pocket) 
 
19. Do you daydream when you out to be listening   0    1    2    3    4  
      to something? 
    
20. Do you find you forget people’s names?    0    1    2    3    4  
 
21. Do you start doing one thing at home and get    0    1    2    3    4  
      distracted into doing something else (unintentionally)? 
 
22. Do you find you can’t quite remember something    0    1    2    3    4  
      although it’s on the tip of your tongue? 
 
23. Do you find you forget what you came to the shops to buy?  0    1    2    3    4  
 
24. Do you drop things?       0    1    2    3    4  
 








A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below.  Read 
each statement and use the following scale to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this 
moment.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any one 
statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
        1          2           3             4 
 Not At All  Somewhat  Moderately So  Very Much So 
_____  1.  I feel calm. 
_____  2.  I feel secure. 
_____  3.  I am tense. 
_____  4.  I feel strained. 
_____  5.  I feel at ease. 
_____  6.  I feel upset. 
_____  7.  I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes. 
_____  8.  I feel satisfied. 
_____  9.  I feel frightened. 
_____  10. I feel comfortable. 
_____  11. I feel self-confident. 
_____  12. I feel nervous. 
_____  13. I am jittery. 
_____  14. I feel indecisive. 
_____  15. I am relaxed. 
_____  16. I feel content. 
_____  17. I am worried. 
_____  18. I feel confused. 
_____  19. I feel steady. 
_____  20. I feel pleasant. 
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Read each statement below and indicate how you generally feel.  Do not spend too much time on 
any one item but give the answer which seems to be best describe how you generally feel. 
             1         2     3               4 
  Almost Never  Sometimes  Often  Almost Always 
_____  21. I feel pleasant. 
_____  22. I feel nervous and restless. 
_____  23. I feel satisfied with myself. 
_____  24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be. 
_____  25. I feel like a failure. 
_____  26. I feel rested. 
_____  27. I am “calm, cool, and collected.” 
_____  28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them. 
_____  29. I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter. 
_____  30. I am happy. 
_____  31. I have disturbing thoughts. 
_____  32. I lack self-confidence. 
_____  33. I feel secure. 
_____  34. I make decisions easily. 
_____  35. I feel inadequate. 
_____  36. I am content. 
_____  37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me. 
_____  38. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind. 
_____  39. I am a steady person. 






Here are some different ways that people can feel about working and concentrating. Please 
indicate how strongly each statement applies to you.   
1 = Almost never  
2 = Sometimes  
3 = Often  
4 = Always 
               
1. It’s very hard for me to concentrate on a difficult task      1    2    3    4   
when there are noises around. 
 
2. When I need to concentrate and solve a problem,             1    2    3    4                   
I have trouble focusing my attention. 
 
3. When I am working hard on something,     1    2    3    4   
I still get distracted by events around me. 
 
4. My concentration is good even if     1    2    3    4    
there is music in the room around me. 
 
5. When concentrating, I can focus my attention so that    1    2    3    4       
I become unaware of what’s going on in the room around me.  
 
6. When I am reading or studying, I am easily distracted   1    2    3    4      
if there are people talking in the same room. 
 
7. When trying to focus my attention on something,                 1    2    3    4               
I have difficulty blocking out distracting thoughts. 
 
8. I have a hard time concentrating when     1    2    3    4      
I’m excited about something. 
 
9. When concentrating I ignore feelings of hunger or thirst.  1    2    3    4       
 
10. I can quickly switch from one task to another.    1    2    3    4 
       
11. It takes me a while to get really involved in a new task.  1    2    3    4  
                  
12. It is difficult for me to coordinate my attention between        1    2    3    4            
the listening and writing required when taking notes  during lectures. 
 
13. I can become interested in a new topic very quickly    1    2    3    4  
when I need to.    
94 
 
1 = Almost never  
2 = Sometimes  
3 = Often  
4 = Always 
 
14. It is easy for me to read or write while I’m also talking   1    2    3    4   
on the phone.    
 
15. I have trouble carrying on two conversations at once.   1    2    3    4  
   
16. I have a hard time coming up with new ideas quickly   1    2    3    4  
 
17. After being interrupted or distracted, I can easily    1    2    3    4  
shift my attention back to what I was doing before. 
 
18. When a distracting thought comes to mind, it is easy    1    2    3    4  
for me to shift my attention away from it. 
 
19. It is easy for me to alternate between two different tasks.   1    2    3    4  
  
20. It is hard for me to break from one way of thinking about  1    2    3    4  
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environments.  However, these models are relatively nonspecific about the effects and 
basic mechanisms of this process.  The current study drew from attentional control theory 
in order to provide specific predictions, namely, that anxiety interferes with processing 
efficiency, particularly in the executive control processes of inhibition and shifting.  The 
current study tested whether socially anxious individuals demonstrated impaired 
processing efficiency at the neural and behavioral level, and whether this was 
exacerbated by a manipulation of self-focused attention.  Thirty-two (16 socially anxious, 
16 non-anxious controls) subjects completed a mixed-antisaccade task with a circle 
which appeared around the instructional cue on 20% of trials.  Participants were told that 
this circle indicated elevated heart rate.  Eye-movements were measured using horizontal 
electrooculography, and event-related brain potentials were derived from EEG data 
collected during the task. 
 
Findings and Conclusions:   
Socially anxious individuals reported that the heart rate feedback made them more self-
conscious and interfered more with their performance on the task compared to controls.  
The socially anxious group also demonstrated impaired processing efficiency as indicated 
by delayed onset of correct saccades compared to controls, but made fewer errors.  
Additionally, socially anxious individuals had lower P3b amplitude compared to controls, 
suggesting greater effort in discriminating cues, and later P3b latency for trials on which 
heart rate feedback was present, suggesting delayed cue categorization.  Furthermore, 
socially anxious individuals had greater CNV negativity compared to controls, suggesting 
greater recruitment of attentional resources for response preparation, and later onset of 
this component, suggesting delayed response preparation.  These results were as 
hypothesized and are generally consistent with attentional control theory.  The current 
study supports the applicability of this model for cognitive theories of social anxiety and 
expands these theories by providing evidence of impaired neural and behavioral 
functioning in social anxiety, especially as a result of self-focused attention. 
 
